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RHETORIC VERSUS REALITY:

U.S. RESISTANCE TO GLOBAL TRADE RULES AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR CYBERSECURITY AND INTERNET
GOVERNANCE

Eric L. Richards, JD*, Scott J. Shackelford, JD
PhD**, & Abbey Stemler, JD MBA***
I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines two parallel issues of vital
importance to the United States and to the rest of the worldfree trade and cybersecurity. In the free trade context, we
argue that the U.S. government has voiced lofty ideals in
theory, only to ignore and sometimes openly flout its
international obligations in practice. Not only is this harmful to
the balance sheets of U.S. consumers and exporters, but it
simultaneously threatens to undermine the U.S. leadership on
a host of global policy issues, including Internet governance.
The developing world has long accused the United States
and other advanced industrial nations of preaching free trade
and forcing open markets in developing countries while
concurrently protecting their domestic producers from foreign
competition. 2 Former WTO Director-General
Supachai
Panitchpakdi suggested that the real blame for this divergence
resided with private industry groups that were thwarting
globalization efforts by pressuring their governments into filing
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1

See generally Martin Wolf, Era of a Diminished Superpower, FIN. TIMES

(May

15,

2012),

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5e8e3902-9dbl- 1llel-9a9e-

00144feabdc.html#axzz3BkOKFQUL (arguing that the U.S.'s role in global
affairs is decreasing).
2.

(2002).
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frivolous complaints rather than making the adjustments
necessary for survival in open and competitive markets. 3 This
scene unfolds with increasing regularity in the United States.
Political decision makers, while espousing free trade rhetoric,
often replace globalization and the theory of comparative
advantage with strategic intervention, whereby free trade
policies are supplemented by varying combinations of export
subsidies and import barriers. 4 One manifestation of this
debate in the U.S. context is the American response to dumping
claims and their relevance to international trade law. When
antidumping measures are used to offset the market
distortions caused by unfairly traded imports, they are
consistent with global trade law. However, U.S. trade partners
and domestic importers long complained that the U. S.
persistently employed protectionist mechanisms-zeroing and
Byrd Amendment payments-that raised the price of foreign
goods and domestic goods created with foreign inputs. Despite
the fact that the World Trade Organization (WTO) found both
devices to clearly violate international trade rules, the U.S.
government refused to dismantle the programs until forced to
do so by a combination of domestic budgetary woes and
economic retaliation by trading partners.
U.S. recalcitrance has serious implications for its role as a
policy leader in free trade, cybersecurity, and Internet
governance. After all, nearly two decades after its birth, the
WTO is struggling to fulfill its promise of "an integrated, more
viable and durable multilateral trading system."7 As it labors to
develop, administer, and protect a rule-based international
trade regime, the organization has been assailed on two fronts.

3. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO ChiefBlasts Private Sector for Efforts to Push
Dispute Cases, 21 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1780 (Nov. 4, 2004).

4. See Alan 0. Sykes, The PersistentPuzzles of Safeguards:Lessons from
the Steel Dispute, 7 J. INT'L. ECON. L. 523, 564 (2004).
5. See generally ERIC RICHARDS & SCOTT SHACKELFORD, LEGAL AND
ETHICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL BuSINESS 161 (2014).

6. See generally Chad P. Bown & Thomas J. Prusa, U.S. Antidumping
Much Ado about Zeroing (World Bank Pol'y Res. Working Paper No. 5352,

2010) (stating that zeroing violates the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement);
Appellate Body Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Offset Act of 2000,
318-19 WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16,
2003) (stating that the U.S. violated the Anti-Dumping Agreement, the SCM
Agreement, and the WTO Agreement).
7.

General Agreement

on Tariffs

and Trade:

Multilateral

Trade

Negotiations Final Act Embodying Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, MTN/FA II, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994).
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On one side, critics in the United States and leaders from other
developed nations charge the WTO's dispute settlement bodies
with overstepping their bounds and, ultimately, threatening
national sovereignty.8 On the other side, developing nations
complain that free trade and economic globalization are not
bringing about positive effects on their job markets and human
rights protection. 9 They view the WTO as "the most obvious
symbol of the global inequities and the hypocrisy of the
advanced industrial countries." 10 Outcries against these alleged
"bait-and-switch" practices have resonated in both the free
trade and cybersecurity arenas." This narrative has newfound
resonance at a time of rapidly increasing interest in the
multifaceted cyber threat facing the public and private
sectors,2 and is particularly relevant when discussing how the
desire for protecting trade secrets for national industries from
cybercriminals
is
impacting bilateral,
regional,
and
multilateral trade negotiations. 3
The dispute over U.S. antidumping practices illustrates
the "collision course between the (largely) free trade principles
the WTO implements and the (largely) protectionist U.S. trade
laws." 4 As such, it showcases "a central problem for the future
of the trading system-how to reconcile competing views about
8. It has been argued that the U.S., long accustomed to its dominance in
international relations, cannot accept the hard realities of a rule-based
system. WTO foes in the U.S. have long bemoaned this loss of sovereignty as
they push the country toward a more isolationist and power-oriented trading

posture. See Yong K. Kim, The Beginnings of the Rule of Law in the
InternationalTrade System Despite U.S. ConstitutionalConstraints, 17 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 967, 1008 (1996).
9.

See generally THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

(Jerry

Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996) (analyzing and critiquing the effects

of globalization).
10.
11.

Stiglitz, supra note 2, at 244.
See id.; Jeffrey Roman, The Impact of Cybersecurity on Trade, BANK

INFO SECURITY (Nov. 25, 2013),

cybersecurity-on-trade-a-6245/op- 1.

http://www.bankinfosecurity.conmimpact-

12. See generally SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER ATTACKS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE

1-25 (2014) (analyzing the state of cybersecurity and its effect on global
politics).
13. See, e.g., David S. Levine, Could Overreaction to Cybersecurity Threats
Hurt

Transparency

at

Home?,

SLATE

(June

12,

2013),

http://www.slate.com/blogs/future tense/2013/06/12/trade secret law reform
to fight cybersecurity could hurt transparency.html.
14. Gregory Husisian, When a New Sheriff Comes to Town: The
Impending Showdown Between the U.S. Trade Courts and the World Trade
Organization, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 457, 463 (2003).
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the allocation of power between national governments and
international institutions." 5 This same policy debate is playing
out in the Internet governance context as more nations seek to
assert their sovereignty online, threatening a conflict with U.S.
ideals of free speech and free trade.
Part II of this article delves into the long-running debate
over U.S. antidumping practices, focusing on the U.S.
experience and the applicable global trade law. Part III then
investigates the role of protectionist trade policies in the
cybersecurity and Internet governance contexts. Finally, the
article proposes next steps for bringing U.S. principles of free
trade and free speech into alignment with U.S. policy at a time
when emerging power centers are challenging U.S. leadership
across a range of issues, including trade liberalization and
Internet governance.
II. U.S. ANTIDUMPING PRACTICES
Historically, dumping was thought to occur when products
were sold more cheaply abroad than they were sold at home. It
was actionable-deserving of countervailing antidumping6
duties-if it injured an industry in the importing country.
However, the United States and the rest of the world have
generally expanded the dumping definition to include instances
where there are "sales below [the] fully allocated cost of
production, even where the price charged for the merchandise
was the same as that in the importing country." 7 Domestic
producers in the importing country condemn dumping as a
form of predatory pricing designed to drive them out of
business.
Nothing in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT)-the rules governing the international trade in goodsspecifically proscribes dumping, although it does authorize
WTO member nations to impose antidumping duties to offset

15. Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures,
Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L
L. 193, 194 (1996).
16. See Daniel K. Tarullo, The Hidden Costs of International Dispute
Settlement: WTO Review of Domestic Anti-dumping Decisions, 34 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 109, 111 (2002).
17. Id.; see also Kevin K. Ho, TradingRights and Wrongs: The 2002 Bush
Steel Tariffs, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 825, 828 (2003).
18. See generally Ho, supra note 17, at 828.

2015]

RHETORIC V REALITY

the price advantage that dumped goods have in an import
market. 19 In fact, the international trade regime provides an
integrated set of rules governing the use of these offsetting
tariffs in GATT Article VI, as well as in a subsequent WTO
antidumping accord,20 which establishes the international rules
by which WTO members may determine the existence of
dumping.2'

A. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND ZEROING
Dumping investigations have long been the most
commercially significant and frequently used weapons in the
U.S. arsenal against unfairly traded imports.22 International
trade rules permit countries to impose special customs tariffs
(antidumping duties) when dumped imports cause, or threaten
to cause, material injury to competing industries in import
markets. 23 The antidumping duties are permissible as long as
they equal the difference between the home market sales price
and the export sales price (the dumping margin).24 Under U.S.
law, antidumping duties equal to the dumping margin may be
imposed if the Commerce Department determines that foreign
merchandise is being sold in the United States for less than
fair value and the International Trade Commission finds that a
U.S. industry is either materially injured or threatened with
material injury.25
19. See Report of the Panel, Japan-Trade in Semi-Conductors, 121,
L/6309 (May 4, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 116 (1989) ("Article VI

provided importing countries with the right to levy anti-dumping duties
subject to certain specific conditions but was silent on actions by exporting
countries.").
20. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,

55 U.N.T.S. 194.

21. See Panel Report, United States-Antidumping Act of 1916, 6.208,
WT/DS136/R (Mar. 31, 2000).
22. See James P. Durling, Deference, But Only When Due: WTO Review of
Anti-dumping Measures, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 125, 125-26 (2003).
23. See RICHARDS & SHACKELFORD, supra note 5, at 161.

24. Id. at 161-62.
25. 19 U.S.C.S. § 1673 (1994). When reviewing zeroing cases, the courts
apply the deferential two-part Chevron test that provides deference to agency
interpretations of ambiguous Congressional statutes so long as they are
reasonable. This largely explains judicial acceptance of zeroing methodology in
the United States. The Corus Staal court believed that the Chevron test
trumped even the Charming Betsy doctrine that arises when a court is "faced

with an ambiguous statute and ambiguous international agreement." Corus

Staal BV v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1264 (Ct. Int'l
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At first glance, the antidumping procedure might seem
relatively straightforward: "determine an export price, find a
comparable normal value-typically the price at which the
product is sold domestically-and calculate the margin between
them."26 However, in practice, discovering an export price is
often complicated. Article 2.4 of the WTO's Anti-dumping
Agreement anticipates these problems, explaining how a "fair
comparison" between export price and normal value is to be
conducted. 27 Most countries, including the United States,
interpret these rules as permitting a two-step, multipleaveraging process.28 However, the U.S. practice of zeroing
during the antidumping process has been a source of great
controversy throughout the world.29
Zeroing occurred when the United States averaged a
number of importations over a period of time in order to
determine if they were sold below fair market value. 30 When
examining each subgroup of imports, U.S. regulators assigned
a positive value to those sold below fair market value.3
However, they assigned a value of zero to subgroups that were
sold at or above fair market value, which effectively foreclosed
the possibility that those importations with negative values
could offset importations with positive values.32 In particular,
zeroing methodology was criticized because it had the effect of
inflating the margin of dumping and, as a consequence, the
level of duties imposed. 33 The WTO agreed with this critique,
Trade 2003).
26. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade art. 2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201

("[T]he margin of dumping shall be determined by comparison with a

comparable price of the like product when exported to an appropriate third

country.").
27. Id. art. 2.4.
28. See id.

29. An investigating authority using zeroing methodology assigns a zero

margin to subcategories with a negative dumping margin. There is a clear
statistical bias inherent in this methodology. With zeroing, as long as one
subcategory of export sales had a positive dumping margin, the aggregation
always results in a finding that dumping occurred, even if the vast majority of
subcategories have a negative margin. Bowe Passat Reinigungs-Und
Waschereitechnik Gmbh. v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 1138, 1149 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1996).
30. See RICHARDS & SHACKELFORD, supra note 5, at 162.

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Third Participant Notification and Written Submission by the
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consistently striking 34"down zeroing employed in every different
comparison context."
Despite these setbacks, the United States continued to
employ the zeroing methodology, 35 even though the WTO did
not waiver in its condemnation of the practice. Finally, in the
face of growing international pressure, the Commerce
Department announced that it would cease the practice of
zeroing in original investigations effective on February 22,
2007.36 But that is not the end of the story. It took the United
States another five years before it announced, on February 14,
2012, that it would eliminate zeroing in "future administrative
reviews of existing antidumping orders." 37 However, this
change seemed to be less of a capitulation to the authority of
WTO law and more of a realization that reform was the only
way to avoid retaliatory tariffs imposed on U.S. exports by
major trade partners. 38 Still, the matter may not be over, as
U.S. trade partners "have demanded that the United States

European Communities, United States-Final Anti-Dumping Measures on
Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/ DS344 (Feb. 25, 2008), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/june/tradoc 139369.pdf ("It is not
contested that, all other things being equal, the use of zeroing in the
computation of either the margin of dumping for cash deposit purposes or the
amount of duty finally assessed systematically and inevitably inflates the
dumping margin and amount of duty, compared to a computation without
zeroing.").
34. Sungjoon Cho, A WTO Panel Openly Rejects the Appellate Body's
"Zeroing"
Case
Law,
ASIL
INSIGHTS,
Mar.
11,
2008,
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/12/issue/3/wto-panel-openly-rejectsappellate-bodys-zeroing-case-law# edni.
35. See Corns Staal BV v. Dep't of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) ("[T]he Court of International Trade was correct to find Commerce's
zeroing methodology permissible in the context of administrative
investigations."); see also Timken Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2004) ("According Commerce its proper deference, we hold that it
reasonably interpreted § 1677(35)(A) to allow for zeroing.").
36. Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average
Dumping Margin During an Antidumping Investigation; Final Modification,
71 Fed. Reg. 77,722 (Dec. 27, 2006); Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of
the Weighted-Average Dumping Margins in Antidumping Investigations;
Change in Effective Date of Final Modification, 72 Fed. Reg. 3,783 (Jan. 26,
2007).
37. Sungjoon Cho, No More Zeroing?: The United States Changes Its
Antidumping Policy to Comply with the WTO, 16 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTS
(Mar. 9, 2012), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/8/nomore-zeroing-united-states-changes-its-antidumping-policy-comply-wto;
see
also Final Modification, 77 Fed. Reg. 8,181 (Feb. 14, 2012).
38. See, e.g., JTEKT Corp. v. United States, 642 Fed. 3d 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Dongbu Steel v. United States, 635 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

166

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INTL LAW

[Vol. 24:2

correct the results of past administrative reviews that
calculated dumping margins using zeroing."39
One can only speculate as to what economic and political
damage was wrought by U.S. refusal to comply with WTO
decisions. The fact that its eventual, yet reluctant, compliance
with international law was largely in response to the threat of
economic sanctions by other countries suggests that the U.S.'s
adherence to free trade and the rule of law is more rhetoric
than reality. The next section examines another instance-the
Byrd Amendment-where the U.S. commitment to free trade
and international law has been called into question.
B. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE BYRD
AMENDMENT
Even before the zeroing controversy raised the ire of U.S.
trade partners, the very concept of antidumping relief was
under fire from much of the developing world. In part, this is
because the global antidumping rules were largely crafted by
the United States, with assistance from the European Union
(EU).40 As the U.S. lowered its tariffs (hoping to spur its trading
partners to reciprocate), it relaxed its antidumping laws "to
protect domestic industries hurt by lowered tariffs." 41 Despite
widespread criticism of antidumping remedies, the United
States has a long history of "intransigence against reforming
the international law governing antidumping."42 For instance,
in yet another bold protectionist move, the U.S. Congress
enacted the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (Byrd
Amendment). 4 3 Before the Byrd Amendment, proceeds from
antidumping duties were delivered to the general revenue fund
of the U.S. Treasury Department. 44 "Under the Byrd
Amendment, however, the proceeds from these duties ...
[were] diverted into the bank accounts of the U.S. companies
39. Tania Voon, Orange Juice, Shrimp, and the United States Response to
Adverse WTO Rulings on Zeroing, 15 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. INSIGHTS (July 20,
2011), availableat http://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/insight110720.pdf.
40. Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia's Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 1, 3 (2012).
41. Id. at 9.
42. Id. at 6.
43. Byrd Amendment, 19 U.S.C. §1675(c) (2000).

44. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ISSUES AND EFFECTS OF
IMPLEMENTING THE CONTINUED DUMPING AND SUBSIDY OFFSET ACT 1 (2005)
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247929.pdf.
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45
for whose protection the duties are imposed."
In theory, the Byrd Amendment was "characterized as a
'victim's compensation fund' for those proving themselves
materially injured, or threatened with material injury, by
dumping."46 However, the manner in which it was enacted
suggests that its real purpose was to provide protectionistmotivated advantages to a few select firms. Because the
amendment was attached "to a large appropriations bill,
Senator Byrd was able to significantly reduce the possibility of
a presidential veto."47 When signing the legislation, former
President Clinton complained that it "'provide[s] select U.S.
industries with a subsidy above and beyond the protection level
needed' and called on Congress to 'override this provision or
amend it.' 48 Senator John McCain also criticized the legislation
"and predict[ed] that the provision would be found to violate
the U.S.'s World Trade Organization... obligations.' 49
Senator McCain's prediction proved correct. Eleven U.S.
trading partners challenged the provision and, ultimately, the
WTO's Appellate Body held that it was a "non-permissible
specific action against dumping."50 Basically, the assessment of
antidumping duties raises the price of the imports to a fair
market value, resulting in a double remedy and acts, therefore,
as an unfair subsidy. 51 Still, the U.S. government made no
serious attempt to repeal or amend the statute until key trade
partners such as the EU, Canada, Japan, and Mexico
threatened to enact retaliatory trade sanctions.5 2 Once the
WTO approved the assessment of more than $150 million

45. Tudor N. Rus, Recent Development: The Short, Unhappy Life of the
Byrd Amendment, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 427, 431 (2006/2007).
46. Joseph M. Barbato, Byrd Watching: Continuation of the Continued
Dumping And Subsidy Offset Act, 14 CURRENTS INT'L TRADE L.J. 45, 47
(2005).

47. Id. at 46-47.
48. Rus, supra note 45, at 434.
49. Id. at 433-34 (quoting 146 Cong. Rec. S10,669, S10,672 (2000)).
50. Appellate Body Report, United States - Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, 274, WT/DS217/AB/R, (Jan. 16, 2003).
51. See Andrew Platt, The Fate of Domestic Exporters Under The Byrd

Amendment: A Case For Resuscitating the Last-In-Time Treaty Interpretation,
3 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 171, 171 (2007) (arguing a problem occurs
"when the anti-dumping duties bring imports up to market value, because the
subsequent payments subsidize the American producers that are no longer at
an unfair disadvantage").
52. Barbato, supra note 46, at 49.
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annual trade sanctions on U.S. exports, 3 the Byrd Amendment
was repealed-five years after it was enacted. 4
As with the zeroing debacle, the United States set a bad
example with its passage of the Byrd Amendment, creating a
pernicious effect on the country's ability to forge global
solutions to transnational issues and problems. When speaking
to Congress, former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick
observed that, "it helps us to get others to follow the rules if we
follow the rules (ourselves)."5 5 If the U.S. hopes to maintain a
leadership role on pressing global problems, such as free trade
and Internet governance, it must work to repair its damaged
reputation. Otherwise the consequences could be severe, as is
explored in Part II.
III. IMPLICATION FOR CYBERSECURITY AND
INTERNET GOVERNANCE
One thing is certain-much of the world believes that the
U.S. has a bad track record when it comes to the protectionist
demands of its domestic producers. For instance, citing
Washington's poor compliance record with WTO rulings, the
EU Commission has concluded that domestic protectionist
pressures were "stronger than... [Washington's] willingness to
seek 'internationally agreed solutions.' ' 6 Similar debates are
playing out with regard to enhancing cybersecurity, such as the
U.S.'s worry over safeguarding critical infrastructure as seen in
the commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) program, 7 and the impact
of the U.S. technology sector on reforming Internet governance,
each of which is explored below.

53. See id.

54. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, §7601, 120 Stat. 4,
154 (2006).
55. Rus, supra note 45, at 441.
56. Gary G. Yerkey, ProtectionistPressures in U.S. ForcingBush to Ignore
WTO Obligations, EC Says, 21 INT. TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 1, at 19 (Jan. 1,
2004).

57. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford, How to Enhance Cybersecurity and
2012),

Create
American
Jobs,
HUFF.
POST
(July
16,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-j-shackelford/how-to-enhancecybersecurity b 1673860.html.
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A. USING INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW TO
MITIGATE THE CYBER THREAT TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR

International trade and investment law offer an array of
tools to mitigate the multifaceted cyber challenges faced by the
private sector, including the threat posed by sophisticated
cybercrime organizations, some of which are sponsored by
states, which target the trade secrets and other valuable
intellectual property of companies and countries alike. 58
Ongoing U.S.-EU trade talks have been shaped by concerns
over NSA surveillance programs and intellectual property
protections.59 The proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
also reportedly contains a cybersecurity component.6 0 Even the
WTO employs enforcement mechanisms that may be applicable
to cyber attacks, if national security concerns could be
61
overcome.
However, the rise of bilateral investment treaties (BITs)
may provide an even more useful vehicle to mitigate cyber
attacks and better protect trade secrets, which according to
some estimates "comprise an average of two-thirds of the value
of firms' information portfolios." 2 By 2013, there were nearly
3,000 BITs, involving the vast majority of countries.6 3 These
agreements cover a large cross-section of industries and boast a

58. For an extended discussion of this topic, see Scott J. Shackelford, Eric
L. Richards, Anjanette H. Raymond, & Amanda N. Craig, Using BITs to
Protect Bytes: Promoting Cyber Peace by SafeguardingTrade Secrets Through
BilateralInvestment Treaties, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2015).
59. See, e.g., Doug Palmer, U.S. EU Launch Free Trade Talks Despite
Spying
Concerns,
INS.
J.
(July
9,
2013),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2013/07/09/297817.htm.
60. See Kevin Collier, Sen. Ron Wyden on the Problems with the TransPacific
Partnership,
DAILY
DOT
(Sept.
19,
2012),
http://www.dailydot.com/politics/ron-wyden-trans-pacific-partnership/.
61. See, e.g., Allan A. Friedman, Cybersecurity and Trade: National
Policies, Global and Local Consequences, (Brookings Inst., Washington D.C.),
September 2013, at 10-11; JAMES A. LEWIS, CTR. STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD.,

CONFLICT AND NEGOTIATION IN CYBERSPACE 49-51 (2013), available at

https://csis.org/files/publication/130208 Lewis ConflictCyberspace Web.pdf.

62. KURT CALIA ET AL., ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND TRADE SECRET THEFT:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND POLICY RESPONSES, COVINGTON

&

BURLING

LLP

3

(2013),

available

http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/Economic%20Espionage%20and%20Trade
%20Secret%20Theft%20-%20September%202013.pdf.
63.

at

UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013: GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS:

INVESTMENT AND

TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT

101

(2013),

http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013 en.pdf.

available at
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robust forum for resolving disputes in the form of investorstate arbitration.6 4 At the July 2013 U.S.-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue, the U.S. and China publicized plans to
negotiate an expansive BIT that could include the difficult
issue of enhancing bilateral cybersecurity. 6 This deal, if
finalized, may provide a roadmap to increase the effectiveness
of trade and investment law in enhancing cybersecurity if
difficulties such as the national security exemption and
66
investor-state arbitration controversies are overcome.
B. APPLICATION TO THE FUTURE OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE
As with promoting free trade, the future shape of Internet
governance is increasingly intertwined with the role of the
state in enhancing national cybersecurity. This evolution may
be seen by considering the three eras of Internet governance
that have culminated in contemporary debates pitting groups
of nations preferring Internet sovereignty against those
seeking greater Internet freedom.67 In brief, the story of
Internet governance begins when graduate students created ad
hoc organizations, such as the Internet Engineering Task
Force, to improve the functionality of the Internet. 8 This first
phase of Internet governance arguably extended from roughly
1969 to the birth of the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) in 1998.9 Phase Two overlapped
with the Internet's economic success and the rise of ICANN
and other formal and informal Internet governance
organizations that together sought to address, among other
64. See Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC
LAW 6 (2007).
65. See Annie Lowrey, U.S. and China to Discuss Investment Treaty, but
Cybersecurity Is a Concern, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2013, at A5, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/12/world/asia/us-and-china-to-discuss-invest
ment-treaty-but-cybersecurity-is-a-concern.html? r=0.
66. See Shackelford et al., supra note 58, at 4, 6, & 28.

67. See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE
HIDE? 183 (2011).
68. See
Internet
History,
COMPUTER
HISTORY
MUSEUM,

http://www.computerhistory.org/internet history/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
For an extended treatment of this issue, see Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N.
Craig, Beyond the New 'Digital Divide': Analyzing the Evolving Role of

Governments in Internet Governance and Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 STAN.

J. INT'L L. 119 (2014).
69. MILTON MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND
THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE 89 (2002).
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issues, the first global "digital divide" represented by the
divergence of information and communication technology
resources between developed and developing nations, and
culminated with the creation of the Internet Governance
Forum (IGF) in 2006. 70 Finally, Phase Three has been defined
to date by an increased role for national governments in
Internet governance, underscoring the potential for a "new
'digital divide' to emerge not between the "haves and havenots" but between "the open and the closed[." This notion was
crystallized at the 2012 World Conference on International
Telecommunications (WCIT).7'
Revelations from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden
have served to further entrench criticism of the U.S.-led status
quo of Internet governance, much like the international
response to zeroing and the Byrd Amendment. The Snowden
incident arguably contributed to the U.S. decision to announce
that the U.S. Department of Commerce would not renew its
contract with ICANN.72 Also, as with the Byrd Amendment
saga, the U.S. private sector has played an important role in
shaping the U.S. government's position on Internet governance,
including WCIT, for example, challenging the case for
expanding the International Telecommunication Union's
mandate to cover Internet governance.73 In this case, though,
the minority is pushing a majority U.S. view as to the
importance of protecting free speech in the "global networked
commons" of cyberspace,74 even as the U.S. technology sector is

70. See ANDREW W. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL
IN THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 122 (2007).

71. Larry Downes, Requiem for Failed UN Telecom Treaty: No One
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the
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FORBES
(Dec.
17,
2012,
5:30
AM),

http://www.forbes.conmsites/larrydownes/2012/12/17/no-one-mourns-the-wcit/.
However, there is also evidence that the multi-stakeholder status quo of
Internet governance may continue for the foreseeable future. SeeNETmundial
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2014),
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WASH.

POST

(Mar.
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/us-to-relinquish-

2014),
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developing some of the most advanced censorship technologies
in the world.75 Yet there is also evidence that these U.S.
practices are causing tensions with some of the trading
partners hurt by U.S. trading practices, impacting the
competitiveness of the U.S. industry, and threatening direct
and indirect reprisals.7
IV. CONCLUSION
Continued resistance to WTO-mandated policies is likely to
have long-lasting and far-reaching consequences. At one level,
"America's commitment to freer trade looks laughable," 7
reinforcing accusations from trading partners that Washington
is backsliding on negotiated trade concessions because of its
inability to resist the protectionist demands from domestic
producers. 8 While most nations currently lack the economic
might to restrain U.S. transgressions, the U.S. may soon be
unable to strong-arm competitors in matters of trade or
Internet governance. For instance, Mandarin could well be the
dominant language on the Internet by 2017.
Of equal
importance, recalcitrance poses a long-term threat to the
worldwide economy. It also has immediate domestic
ramifications-some visible, and many largely hidden from the
public eye. Clearly, protectionist policies practiced by the U.S.,
such as zeroing and the Byrd Amendment, have imposed costs
to both domestic and global welfare. They also have
implications for pending trade agreements with other nations,
including the TPP and the proposed U.S.-EU free trade area,

Freedom
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21,
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available
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http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rn2010/01/135519.htm.
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the latter of which would represent more than forty percent of
global GDP. 80 Surprisingly, relatively little has been written on
the topic of the threat to the global trade regime of growing use
of antidumping remedies (patterned after U.S. practices) by
China. 81 And there has been even less appreciation of the link
between U.S. antidumping transgressions and the related U.S.
policy priorities of enhancing cybersecurity and shaping
Internet governance.
Free trade and free speech are ideals that have been
central to the success of U.S. industry and the rise of American
soft power. It is vital that these tenets are protected by writing
off the misguided practices in antidumping law; favoring
domestic industry only insofar as it is essential to enhance
national cybersecurity, such as by safeguarding critical
infrastructure; and arguing for free speech online not because
of the power of well-connected lobbies working both sides of the
debate, but to ensure consistency with long held U.S. ideals. In
order to fight the prevailing narrative of relative U.S. decline, 2
Congress and the Obama Administration should reinvigorate
stalled bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade talks and
actively shape a global, multi-stakeholder vision of Internet
governance. Neither trade policy, nor the future of the Internet,
need be zero sum games. It is time for U.S. rhetoric to match
political realities.
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Century?, THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 20, 2013), http://thediplomat.conmpacific-
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